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8
9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10
11 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

13 Plaintiff,

v.

14 NEHEMIAH AVILA,
15 CEASAR MARTINEZ, and
RICARDO MARMOLEJO,

16 Defendants.

17 CASE NO. 2:21-CR-0020-MCE

18 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE
TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
ORDER

19 DATE: June 24, 2021

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

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28 **BACKGROUND**

29 This case is set for a status hearing on June 24, 2021. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued
30 General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until further
31 notice.” Under General Order 618, a judge “may exercise his or her authority to continue matters,
32 excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the court’s prior General Order 611 issued
33 on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings to support the exclusion in the Judge’s discretion.”
34 General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any judge “may order case-by-case
35 exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that Judge or upon the request of
36 counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order will
37 impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This and previous
38 General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

1 Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has
2 emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive
3 openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case.
4 *Zedner v. United States*, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no
5 exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.* at
6 509; *see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez*, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a
7 judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally
8 or in writing").

9 Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory
10 and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-
11 justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his
12 findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and
13 the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable
14 unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that
15 the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public
16 and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id.*

17 The General Orders exclude delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code
18 T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics,
19 natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such
20 circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance
21 following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court
22 recognized that the eruption created "appreciable difficulty" for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-69; *see*
23 *also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time
24 following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency).

25 The coronavirus poses a similar, albeit more enduring, "appreciable difficulty" to the prompt
26 proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a "non-
27 exhaustive" list of seven factors it found to be "relevant" in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act
28 continuances "in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic." *United States v. Olsen*, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL

1 1589359 at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2021). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is
2 detained pending trial; (2) how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked
3 speedy trial rights since the case's inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a
4 population that is particularly susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness
5 of the charges a defendant faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes;
6 (6) whether there is a reason to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed;
7 and (7) whether the district court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. *Id.*

8 In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding
9 excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7)
10 (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the hearing. *United States v.*
11 *Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be “specifically
12 limited in time”).

13 **STIPULATION**

14 Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and
15 through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

16 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status hearing on June 24, 2021.

17 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the hearing until August 12, 2021,
18 and to exclude time between June 24, 2021, and August 12, 2021, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A),
19 B(iv) [Local Code T4].

20 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

21 a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case
22 includes criminal history documents; reports of investigation; videos; and Title III wire materials
23 for five phone accounts, including wire intercepts, line sheets, and affidavits. All of this
24 discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and
25 copying. Additional discovery is forthcoming.

26 b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, review
27 the current and forthcoming discovery, conduct investigation and research related to the current
28 charges, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions, and to

1 otherwise prepare for trial.

2 c) Counsel for defendant believe that failure to grant the above-requested
3 continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into
4 account the exercise of due diligence.

5 d) The government does not object to the continuance.

6 e) In addition, because of the public health concerns cited by the General Orders and
7 presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in
8 this case.

9 f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the
10 case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the
11 original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

12 g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161,
13 et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 24, 2021 to August 12, 2021,
14 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]
15 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of
16 the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest
17 of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: June 21, 2021

PHILLIP A. TALBERT
Acting United States Attorney

Dated: June 21, 2021

/s/ TODD D. LERAS
TODD D. LERAS
Counsel for Defendant
RICARDO MARMOLEJO

Dated: June 21, 2021

/s/ MICHAEL D. LONG
MICHAEL D. LONG
Counsel for Defendant
CEASAR MARTINEZ

Dated: June 21, 2021

/s/ DINA SANTOS
DINA SANTOS
Counsel for Defendant
RICARDO MARMOLEJO

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2021

Morrison C. England, Jr.
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE